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Reply Argument 
I. 
28 U.S.C. 1441(c) Can Not Support Removal; Removal Unreasonable 
BYU states they relied on 28 U.S.C. §1441(c) in their efforts to remove the 
state case to federal court. See Brief of Appellee (App. Br.) at 11. 
BYU however fails to quote the text of §1441(c). 
§ 1441(c) states: 
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within 
the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or 
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case 
may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, 
in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates. 
§1331 states: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 
The facts are not in dispute. When BYU attempted removal, there were no 
"claims arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" found 
in the underlying case of this appeal. 
Because there were no "claims arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States" found in the underlying case of this appeal and 
because 1441(c) requires that a case being removed to federal court must be joined 
with "claims arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States", 
removal was improper. 
No reasonable attorney reading 1441(c) and observing that that state case 
had no federal cause of action would believe that they could remove the case to 
federal court under 1441 (c). 
An attorney is presumed to have a high degree of intelligence and ability to 
use that intelligence. They have been schooled at the doctorate level. Medical 
doctors are also schooled at the doctorate level. They to must follow proper 
procedure. A medical doctor reading the proper procedure on how to perform a 
certain procedure, then ignores the plain language of that procedure and does 
something completely different which then causes injury, can not simply shrug off 
the mistake and liability for the mistake. A standard of competence is in place for 
the doctor and they must be held to it. If they are not skilled and competent they 
cause injury. 
It was within the assumed competency of Counsel for BYU to read 1441(c) 
and realize that it did not provide authority to remove because no cause of action 
existed under §1331. 
BYU Counsel not acting reasonably must be found liable for sanctions and 
penalizing Appellant for attempting to redress the wrong of counsel for the 
Appellee is incorrect. 
II. 
The Arrest Warrant Improper 
A. Rule 69 Does Not Exist 
Appellant questions whether BYU made a typographical error as they state. 
Rule 69 does not exist. That should be enough. To rely on a non-existent Rule for 
support to arrest a person is unconscionable. Rules are in place for a reason. 
They can not be discarded or overlooked. Proper procedure must be followed. If 
not what then is due process of law and why does the legislature and executive 
branches of government pass laws for the judiciary to execute and follow. 
But Rule 64, assuming that really was the statute relied on by BYU, does 
not authorize the movant for a supplemental hearing to issue an Order threatening 
the arrest of a person for not attending. The whole matter is troubling from a 
judicial perspective. 
That BYU would mislead the judge that Rule 69 existed and allowed for the 
arrest of Appellant for not attending is unconscionable. The court system is not 
here to guess at statutes and manipulate the system to BYU's advantage. It is here 
to serve the interests of the state, and the state has set forth the proper manner in 
which things are to be done. Rule 69 does not exist. Rule 69 was relied on by 
BYU for the authority for its motion and arrest warrant clause of the motion for 
that supplemental hearing. That alone should be sufficient to vacate the entire 
mess created. 
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B. Signature Stamp Lacking As Required by UCRJA 4-403 
A close look at the signature of the Order for supplemental hearing raises 
serious concerns as to whether it was mechanically signed. Appellant, after close 
examination, believes, and comparison with the other signatures would support 
this, that it not signed by the actual judge. Remand would be proper to determine 
this if the Court can not take judicial notice of the signature on that Order. 
If it is mechanically signed, then the clerk imprinting the signature must, 
according to Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration Rule 4-403 (1)(I) 
and (2) sign their name below the mechanical signature. 
Because the Order for the hearing was mechanically signed and not 
subsequently signed by the clerk issuing it, as required by 4-403, the Order is then 
invalid. 
Here, the weight of the evidence supports Appellant and begins to 
accumulate. Not only was Rule 69 non-existant, but the actual Order for the 
hearing violated 4-403. 
As an officer of the court, BYU is assumed to be aware of 4-403 and is in 
all probability aware that it was issued by some clerk as they went personally to the 
court to obtain the Order ex parte. 
C. URPC3.3 
The accumulation of evidence in Appellant's favor does not stop there. 
Additionally, BYU violated URPC3.3(d). 
BYU simply could have followed standard judicial procedure and filed a 
motion with the court for the supplemental proceeding, allowed Appellant a 
chance to respond (old-fashioned due process of law), and the court would then 
make a decision after hearing both sides on the matter. 
But BYU did not follow standard judicial procedure. They did everything 
ex parte. While BYU cites to no pressing reason for the need of an immediate ex 
parte hearing, they nonetheless sought everything ex parte and in so doing 
URPC3.3(d) must govern their actions. 
BYU App. Br. at 16 states "Specifically, Mr. Raiser's alleged poverty is not 
a material fact". Nothing could be farther from the truth. 
In order to prove contempt for failure to comply with court order it must be 
shown that person cited for contempt (1) knew what was required, (2) had ability 
to comply, and (3) intentionally failed or refused to do so, and trial court must 
enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of three 
substantive elements for contempt. See In re Cannatella, 132 P.3d 684, 686 
(2006). 
In the instant matter, assuming Appellant was being held in contempt of 
court, prior to issuing that bench warrant, the lower court would have had to make 
some finding as to whether Appellant had the ability to comply. So ability to 
comply is essential to the issuing of the warrant and BYU was perfectly aware that 
Appellant was homeless, in California, and barely had enough money to survive, 
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yet remained silent when seeking that Order to require his attendance at the 
7/19/05 hearing and then stood in silence when the judge issued the bench warrant. 
Here, BYU however had an affirmative duty to not remain silent under 
URPC 3.3(d). 
As for the Constitutionality of the matter, Appellant was given no 
opportunity to be heard relative to his ability to attend the hearing. 
D. BYU Raises New "Fact" Not Raised In Lower Court; Must Be Struck 
BYU App. Br. at 17 then interjects alleged facts not found in the record. 
Here Appellant moves this Court to strike this material and the argument relied on 
it. BYU includes and Addendum D - an email - and attempts characterize this as a 
"promise" by Appellant to be in Utah on July 19, 2005. That material not in the 
record has to be struck. 
E. New "Fact" Not Helpful to Them 
Second, if it is not struck, the email(s) show no promise by Appellant to be 
in Utah on that date. Appellant is homeless and at the time extremely poor and 
was required in another court case to do certain depositions in person in Utah. 
Appellant thus had a need to be in Utah at some point in time, but not necessarily 
on July 19, 2005. Appellant made a good faith effort to get the funds together to 
be in Utah for those depositions and Appellant was manipulated into doing those 
depositions on July 19, 2005 due to the supplemental hearing and arrest Order 
threat as he had to attend the supplemental hearing on that date and would be 
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arrested if he did not and if Appellant did gather the funds to travel to Utah, it was 
only going to be once for some time as he did not have the funds to make 2 trips 
there. 
In the end Appellant did not have the funds to travel to Utah on the 19th. 
While Appellant theoretically could have hitch-hiked to Utah it would have been 
unwise. While it might be easy to put a liar label on Appellant and say he is 
making the whole poverty matter up, he is not. He accurately portrayed his 
predicament in the federal court hearing at which time BYU counsel heard, that 
Appellant was homeless and barely had the money for food from day to day. 
Appellant's affidavit for the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is also accurate 
and shows little means for travel to Utah. 
However, in the email, Appellant was anticipating being able to save the 
money to get to Utah by the July 19, 2005 discovery cut off date for the federal 
case. It would be, and was, an extreme burden to save the money to get there, and 
optimistically, Appellant, in the email of Addendum D to App. Br. stated he was 
planning on coming on that date. That email was some 2 months prior to the 
hearing date. Appellant reiterates he used the word "plan" and not promise. The 
word plan was exactly that, and contingent on a number of factors such as saving 
the needed funds to get there. The other email Appellant used the word "believe" 
with respect to his being their on the 19 . Certainly Appellant did not promise and 
there is a big difference. 
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The issue is not whether Appellant planned or believed he could make it, 
but whether BYU was aware that Appellant did not have the means to make it to 
Utah for that hearing. 
Here, BYU was in attendance at the federal hearing where Appellant 
honestly stated he was homeless and barely had the funds to survive from day to 
day. That is significant. Appellant told the judge that in response to the judge 
wanting Appellant to travel to Utah for the depositions, and Appellant had sought 
to do the depositions by phone instead. 
Thus BYU was in possession of critical information regarding Appellant's 
ability to travel to Utah. BYU was very sneaky, highly sneaking and unethical, in 
then seeking an Order, ex parte, which would require Appellant to travel to Utah 
for a hearing or face arrest, yet withheld that information from the judge which 
information was critical with respect to the arrest warrant as the judge according to 
the case law must first determine whether Appellant had the ability to comply with 
the Order to attend the hearing. 
Yet BYU's deceit goes further. BYU would have this court believe they 
had a good faith belief that Appellant had the means to get to the hearing. BYU 
serves up a self serving statement, based on some unidentified source, that they 
believed his parents were giving him money and therefore their conduct was 
proper. See App. Br. at 17. If BYU is to rely on that belief, they should come 
forward with what information they relied on that Appellant was employed full 
10 
time, when he was employed part time at near minimum wage. Further, what lead 
them to believe he received anything from his parents. BYU comes forward with 
no support to lead this court or anyone that their statement was nothing but a self-
serving statement to avoid liability when they had no valid basis for believing that 
Appellant was employed full time or received so much as a penny from his 
parents. 
BYU was present that the federal hearing where Appellant stated he was 
homeless and barely had enough money for food from day to day. How they could 
form a belief his financial condition was anything but that is implausible. 
But an email from counsel for BYU shows that they in fact did not believe 
Appellant had the funds to get to Utah. If the court noticed of R. 416 counsel for 
BYU acknowledges that Appellant did "not have the financial means" to conduct 
the depositions of the federal court case. This Appellant pointed out in the federal 
court hearing at which counsel for BYU was present when he explained why he 
could not travel to Utah for those depositions. They listened, they understood, that 
Appellant did not have the financial means to get to Utah to do those depositions. 
Although Appellant made every effort to get the money for the trip to Utah, it 
proved insurmountable for a homeless person working part-time at near minimum 
wage and living substantially below the poverty limit to get to the hearing. 
Rule 3.3(d) states BYU counsel owed a duty to inform the judge of all the 
facts material to his ability to make a decision ex parte. BYU could have made a 
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motion like any other counsel and allowed Appellant to respond and the judge then 
could have made a decision. But BYU chose not to do that. BYU chose to do it 
ex parte, and BYU was aware Appellant was homeless, and barely had enough 
money for food from day to day in California and that was material as the ability to 
comply with a court order is one element that must be met prior to issuing a 
sanction for missing a court hearing. See In re Cannatella,, 132 P.3d at 686. 
Appellant did make an effort to vacate the hearing prior to the hearing date 
by filing a motion to vacate it due to the improper reliance of URCP 69 which 
Appellant believed was sufficient. That was filed with the court on 6/24/05. R. 
288. Appellant also attempted to stay the Order generating the need for a 
supplemental hearing on 6/10/05 which would have obviated any need for a 
hearing on 7/19/05. So it is not like Appellant did nothing to get the hearing of 
7/19/05 off the calendar. 
The need for the hearing, which was to determine the assets of Appellant 
should have been satisfied by the affidavit of 6/6/05 R. 274 where Appellant, 
under oath, lists a car worth $75 (it barely ran - no cooling system) as his only 
asset in life, along with about $180 in the bank. Theoretically, the $180 could 
have gotten Appellant to Utah but not back to California. Certainly, the court 
should have noticed this predicament and the judge approved the in forma pauperis 
motion for appeal. 
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state court judge In California pliene or something; to get the 
needed information regarding Appellant 's assets than by requiring him to travel to 
Utah In any case, the court: had the information it sought,,, undei oath, that 
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Appellant 's financial condition. 
Perhaps the lower court should have issued an order to show cause prior to 
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M * Ji • 
Amendment of Complaint 
With respect to the ability 10 amend the complaint that should be allowed. 
BYU has not come forward with sufficient argument to shov r that any of those 
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did not receive that notice In fact, appellant show ed the lower court that that 
address is the same address which BYU previously sent Appellant court 
correspondence. R. 168. 
With respect the right to amend the complaint, they say the lower court 
should be upheld as it has discretion to decide allowance to amend, but given the 
history of the case, opportunity should be allowed and the claims considered as had 
BYU not improperly removed the case to federal court, amendment could have 
been made much sooner and the merit of the claims considered and perhaps some 
discovery would have been helpful. 
VI. 
Conclusion & Relief Sought 
The new factual matter raised in Addendum D of App. Br. has to be struck 
as it is not found in the record. Further it is not helpful to BYU's argument. All 
sections in the Appllee's Breif relying on that new material must be struck 
accordingly. 
With respect to the other matters raised, Appellant has shown that BYU was 
unreasonable in removing the case to federal court where no state or federal 
statute supported that action. That conduct was prejudicial in delaying the 
proceedings for an entire year. Opportunity to amend should be allowed and the 
merits of the amended complaint examined in the lower court. 
The sanctions against Appellant for his seeking sanctions for BYU's 
improper removal must be vacated in the interest of justice. To fine a plaintiff any 
iiioiKT .ill .ill (inur stxiiiiji sail lionis I'm ikniin^iii^ lite plaintiffs aso In, illicr 
reckless or intentional abuse of the removal process in uncoiL,w^«*^w. 
Further fining Appellant for seeking sanctions for the abuse by BYIJ of the 
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sought after hearing, wliich violated the rules of professional conduct 3.3, where 
was aware of those facts, if imp"-' 
THe arrest warrant also needs i<> be vacated or resemdeo. ail lines vacated,, 
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Further, either this Court or a new judge should decide whether sanctions 
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Respectfully, 
DATED January 28, 2007 
£-JO^=T 
Aaron R;.'is?r 
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